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Comments
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS: WHY
GRANTING DRIVER’S LICENSES TO DACA BENEFICIARIES
MAKES CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL SENSE
KARI E. D’OTTAVIO ∗
On June 15, 2012, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano announced a new immigration policy entitled Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”). 1 This initiative offers a renewable
two-year grant of deportation relief along with work authorization and
2
a social security number to eligible undocumented immigrants. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals applicants must: be at least fifteen years old, have entered the United States before age sixteen, and
have been under age thirty-one on the date of the DACA announceCopyright © 2013 by Kari E. D’Ottavio.
∗

J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; B.A.

2009, Loyola University Maryland. The author wishes to thank her editors, Reshard Kellici
and Shari H. Silver, for their thoughtful guidance throughout the development of this
Comment, Professor Maureen Sweeney for her immigration expertise and help in keeping
this Comment up-to-date, Mike for helping her choose a topic that aligned with passions
they share, and her parents, Katie and Ted, for their unconditional love and support in all
that she does.
1. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGR. SERVS. (Jan. 18, 2013) [hereinafter DACA Initiative], http://www.uscis.gov/portal
/site/uscis/menuitem.eb (follow “Humanitarian” hyperlink; then follow “Deferred Action
Process for Young People Who Are Law Enforcement Priorities” hyperlink); Secretary Napolitano Announces Deferred Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/
secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-process-young-people-who-are-low.
2. DACA Initiative, supra note 1; Social Security Number—Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/deferred_action.pdf (last
visited Mar. 25, 2013). Applicants must not have lawful immigration status at the time of
their application; they must have either (1) entered the United States without authorization, or (2) entered the United States lawfully (for example, with a visa) but their lawful
status expired (for example, they overstayed the allotted time of their visa). DACA Initiative, supra note 1.
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ment; prove continuous residence in the United States; be currently
5
in school or have graduated from high school; and pass a criminal
6
background check. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has made clear that DACA beneficiaries do not re7
ceive any sort of lawful immigration status, though it has clarified
that DACA beneficiaries are in fact lawfully present in the United
8
States.
3. DACA Initiative, supra note 1. Note that granting deferred action is an act of
prosecutorial discretion by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. Id.
4. Id. Specifically, DACA applicants must prove continuous residence in the United
States for five years prior to the date of the DACA announcement up until they submit
their application, and that they were physically present in the United States on the date of
the announcement. Id.
5. Id. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals applicants may fulfill this educational
requirement by proving they obtained a General Educational Development (“GED”) certificate or were honorably discharged from the U.S. Coast Guard or Armed Forces. Id.
6. Id. Specifically, DACA applicants must prove that they have not been convicted of
any felonies, “significant misdemeanor[s],” or three or more non-significant misdemeanors, and “do not . . . pose a threat to national security or public safety.” Id. “[S]ignificant
misdemeanor[s]” include “offense[s] of domestic violence; sexual abuse or exploitation;
burglary; unlawful possession or use of a firearm; drug distribution or trafficking; or driving under the influence,” or “an offense . . . for which the individual was sentenced to time
in custody of more than 90 days.” Id. “[T]hreat to public safety or national security” includes, inter alia, “gang membership, participation in criminal activities, or participation in
activities that threaten the United States.” Id.; Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND

IMMIGR. SERVS. (Jan. 18, 2013) [hereinafter DACA FAQs], http://www.uscis.gov/

portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb (follow “Humanitarian” hyperlink; then follow “Deferred
Action Process for Young People Who Are Law Enforcement Priorities” hyperlink; then
follow “Frequently Asked Questions” hyperlink).
7. DACA Initiative, supra note 1 (“Deferred action does not provide an individual
with lawful status.”).
8. DACA FAQs, supra note 6 (“An individual who has received deferred action is authorized by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be present in the United
States, and is therefore considered by DHS to be lawfully present during the period deferred action is in effect.”). “Lawful presence” is often thought of as ceasing accrual of unlawful presence, or “period of stay not authorized.”

See Memorandum from Donald

Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations Directorate, Lori Scialabba, Assoc. Dir.,
Refugee, Asylum and Int’l Operations Directorate, and Pearl Chang, Acting Chief, Office
of Pol’y and Strategy, to USCIS Field Leadership, 9–11 (May 6, 2009), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/revision
_redesign_AFM.PDF (explaining the difference between “unlawful status” and “unlawful
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Soon after the announcement, thousands of young immigrants
9
lined up at DACA clinics around the country. At the same time, a
number of states responded with powerful statements in opposition to
10
11
DACA. For example, the governors of Arizona and Nebraska anpresence”). Moreover, “[t]here are some circumstances in which an alien whose status is
actually unlawful is, nevertheless, protected from the accrual of unlawful presence . . . [a]s
a matter of policy . . . .” Id. at 33. Those granted deferred action fall within this category.
Id. at 42.
9. Susan Carroll, Young Immigrants Line Up for Break from Deportation Threat, HOUS.
CHRON. (Aug. 14, 2012, 8:16 PM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/
Young-immigrants-line-up-for-break-from-3788047.php; Alan Gomez, DREAMers Line Up as
Deportation-Reprieve

Program

Begins,

USA

TODAY

(Aug.

16,

2012,

12:34

AM),

http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-08-15/homeland-securityimmigration-program/57065692/1; Julia Preston, Young Immigrants, in America Illegally,
Line Up for Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2012, at A8. It is estimated that as many as 1.76
million undocumented immigrants could benefit from this program. JEANNE BATALOVA &
MICHELLE

MITTELSTADT,

MIGRATION

POL’Y

INST.,

RELIEF

FROM

DEPORTATION:

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE DREAMERS POTENTIALLY ELIGIBLE UNDER THE DEFERRED
ACTION POLICY 1 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS24_
deferredaction.pdf.
10. Arizona Governor Janice K. Brewer issued Executive Order 2012-06, which denied
state benefits to DACA beneficiaries, two months after the DACA announcement. Ariz.
Exec. Order 2012-06, Re-Affirming Intent of Arizona Law in Response to the Federal Government’s
Deferred Action Program (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/
EO_081512_2012-06.pdf. Eventually, the Arizona Motor Vehicle Division revised its list of
identity documents for proving legal presence, a requirement to obtain an Arizona driver’s
license, to specifically exclude employment authorization documents (“EADs”) obtained
by DACA beneficiaries. Identification Requirements, MOTOR VEHICLE DIV., ARIZ. DEP’T OF
TRANSP.,

http://mvd.azdot.gov/mvd/formsandpub/viewPDF.asp?lngProductKey=1410&

lngFormInfoKey=1410 (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). The Motor Vehicle Division still accepted EADs from other individuals, including noncitizens who are beneficiaries of other
types of deferred action. Id.; see also Are Individuals Granted Deferred Action Under the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Policy Eligible for State Driver’s Licenses?, NAT’L IMMIGR. L.
CTR. [hereinafter NILC DACA and Driver’s Licenses], http://www.nilc.org/dacadrivers
licenses.html (last updated Mar. 11, 2013) (“[T]he Arizona Motor Vehicle Division revised
its list of identity documents to exclude EADs obtained by DACA recipients, while preserving eligibility for all other individuals with EADs.”). The Arizona executive order is already
the subject of litigation. See Cindy Carcamo, Arizona Lawsuit Challenges Restrictions on Driver’s Licenses, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/29/nation
/la-na-arizona-licenses-20121130 (“A contingent of civil and immigrant rights organizations launched a lawsuit [on November 29, 2012] against Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer, chal-
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nounced that DACA beneficiaries would not be eligible to receive
12
state benefits, in particular driver’s licenses. Michigan’s Secretary of
13
State initially followed suit. At first, Iowa’s Department of Transportation also announced that it would not issue driver’s licenses to
14
DACA beneficiaries.
The majority of states, however, confirmed that DACA beneficiar15
ies were eligible for driver’s licenses. California even changed its law
16
to reflect its approval. After USCIS’s clarification on the lawful pres-

lenging an executive order she issued that denies driver’s licenses to some youths who recently received immigration relief and work permits under a new Obama administration
program.”).
11. Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman announced his opposition to DACA and stated that Nebraska will not issue driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries. Brent Martin, Nebraska to Defy Obama Administration Deferred Action Program, NEB. RADIO NETWORK (Aug. 20,
2012),

http://nebraskaradionetwork.com/2012/08/20/nebraska-to-defy-obama-admin

istration-deferred-action-program-audio/; Heineman Stands by Driver’s License Policy,
OMAHA.COM (Dec. 4, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.omaha.com/article/20121204/NEWS/
121209866#heineman-stands-by-driver-s-license-policy.
12. Patrik Jonsson, Obama’s DREAM Act-lite Runs into Trouble as Nebraska, Arizona Go
Rogue, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Politics/2012/0818/Obama-s-DREAM-Act-lite-runs-into-more-trouble-as-Nebraska-Arizonago-rogue.
13. Jonathan Oosting, Federal Program Allows Some Illegal Immigrants to Work, but They
Won’t Be Able to Drive in Michigan, MLIVE (Oct. 18. 2012, 12:14 PM), http://www.mlive.com
/politics/index.ssf/2012/10/federal_program_allows_some_il.html.
14. Dar Danielson, DOT Won’t Approve Licenses for Illegals on Deferred Action Status,
RADIO IOWA (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.radioiowa.com/2012/12/27/dot-wont-approvelicenses-for-illegals-on-deferred-action-status/.
15. See NILC DACA and Driver’s Licenses, supra note 10 (noting that governors and
other officials in almost forty states have confirmed that DACA beneficiaries are eligible
for driver’s licenses).
16. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 12801.6 (West 2012) (“(a) Any federal document demonstrating favorable action by the federal government for acceptance of a person into the
deferred action for childhood arrivals program shall satisfy the requirements of Section
12801.5. (b) The department may issue an original driver’s license to the person who
submits proof of presence in the United States as authorized under federal law pursuant to
subdivision (a) and either a social security account number or ineligibility for a social security account number.”).
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18

ence of DACA beneficiaries, Michigan and Iowa reversed course
19
and agreed to issue driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries.

17. See State to Issue Driver’s Licenses to Qualified Deferred Action Program Participants After
Federal Government Reversal, MICH. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.michigan.
gov/sos/0,4670,7-127—294244—,00.html (quoting Michigan Secretary of State Ruth
Johnson: “The feds now say they consider these young people to be lawfully present while
they participate in the DACA program, so we are required to issue driver’s licenses and
identification cards”).
18. See Iowa DOT Will Issue Driver’s Licenses or Nonoperator IDs to Persons Granted Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals Status, IOWA DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.news.iowadot.gov/newsandinfo/2013/01/iowa-dot-will-issue-drivers-licensesor-nonoperator-ids-to-persons-granted-deferred-action-for-child.html (determining that it
can now issue driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries).
19. Likewise, North Carolina’s Division of Motor Vehicles initially showed some resistance to issuing driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries, but quickly turned around after
the State’s Chief Deputy Attorney General issued a legal opinion on the lawful presence of
DACA beneficiaries even before USCIS made this clear. See Letter from Grayson G. Kelley,
N.C. Chief Deputy Attorney Gen., to J. Eric Boyette, Acting Comm’r of the N.C. Div. of
Motor Vehicles (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.latinamericancoalition.org/pdf/
130117-NCAG-letter-to-DMV.pdf (“Based upon our review of the historical background
and legal concepts applicable to prosecutorial discretion and deferred status in the enforcement of immigration laws, we believe that individuals who present documentation
demonstrating a grant of deferred action by the United States government are legally present in the United States and entitled to a drivers license of limited duration, assuming all
other criteria are met.”); see also Bruce Siceloff and Anne Blythe, NC Will Grant Driving Privileges to Immigrants in Federal Program, NEWSOBSERVER (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.news
observer.com/2013/02/14/2680885/nc-will-grant-driving-privileges.html (“The state Division of Motor Vehicles will comply with a state attorney general’s opinion and issue driver’s licenses to thousands of young illegal immigrants who are eligible to drive because of a
federal program that gives them temporary protection from deportation, Transportation
Secretary Tony Tata said [on February 14, 2013].”). Soon after this turnaround, North
Carolina’s Division of Motor Vehicles announced that it would begin to issue newly designed driver’s licenses to certain classes of non-citizens that clearly marked their lack of
lawful status; DACA beneficiaries will be the first class to receive the new licenses. Bertrand M. Gutierrez, New N.C. Driver’s Licenses Will Flag Non-U.S. Citizens, WINSTON-SALEM J.
(Feb. 20, 2013, 8:19 PM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/state_region/article_c2edaa
a8-7bc4-11e2-860d-0019bb30f31a.html (“Across the top of the new license is a pink strip.
In the center, red capital letters say, “NO LAWFUL STATUS.” On the side, another set of
red capital letters say, “LIMITED TERM,” referring to [DACA beneficiaries’] two-year reprieve from deportation.”).
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The overwhelming state support for licensing DACA beneficiaries exemplifies a rare success story in the area of immigrants and driver’s licenses. Access to driver’s licenses for undocumented immigrants has long been contested and became especially restrictive after
20
the September 11th terrorist attacks. Whether states should allow
DACA beneficiaries to obtain driver’s licenses is the most recent de21
bate. This Comment will discuss the legal trends surrounding the
22
debate on issuing driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants,
analyze legal arguments that explain why states that deny driver’s li23
censes to DACA beneficiaries would likely be defeated in court, and
explain why states that allow DACA beneficiaries to obtain driver’s li24
censes made a wise policy decision.
I. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court of the United States has never heard a case
on the legitimacy of a state restriction or prohibition on issuing driv25
er’s licenses to immigrants. Lower federal and state courts, however,
have ruled on various constitutional challenges to immigrant-

20. See infra notes 129–131 and accompanying text.
21. See MUZAFFAR CHISHTI & CLAIRE BERGERON, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. DEFERRED
ACTION PROGRAM REVIVES DEBATE OVER DRIVER’S LICENSES FOR UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS (Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/
display.cfm?ID=926 (“As the number of unauthorized immigrants granted benefits under
the Obama administration’s recent deferred action program reaches a critical mass, it has
rekindled debate over an enduring contentious issue—the role that immigration status
should play in the granting of driver’s licenses.”); Sylvia Cochran, States Clash Over Driver’s
Licenses for Deferred Action Filers, YAHOO!NEWS (Aug. 17, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/
states-clash-over-driver-licenses-deferred-action-filers-161000234.html (discussing Arizona’s
and California’s opposite reactions to DACA); Corey Dade, New Immigration Battle: Driver’s
Licenses, NPR (Dec. 28, 2012, 6:50 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/12/
28/168214192/new-immigration-battle-drivers-licenses (discussing state opposition to
DACA).
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Parts II.A–B.
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. In Alexander v. Sandoval, however, the Court struck down a non-English speaker’s
attempt to force the State of Alabama to provide a driver’s license test in Spanish because
it determined there was no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations
under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 532 U.S. 275, 278–79, 293 (2001).

2013]

DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS

937

26

restrictive driver’s license laws. Part I.A discusses the prevalence of
equal protection challenges to immigrant-restrictive driver’s license
laws. Part I.B discusses the less prevalent but equally important preemption challenges to such laws.
A. Equal Protection Challenges
The Equal Protection Clause provides that “No State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
27
28
laws.” Thus, all forms of state action must comply with this clause.
Depending on the classification they draw and the kind of right they
affect, state laws are subjected to different levels of scrutiny when challenged on equal protection grounds: strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, or rational basis review. The level of scrutiny used can dictate the success of an equal protection claim. Strict scrutiny is used if
a statute classifies a suspect class or impinges on a fundamental
29
right. A court using strict scrutiny review will uphold a law only if
the state can prove that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a com30
pelling state interest. This is a very high burden for the state to
meet; thus the use of strict scrutiny usually results in invalidation of
31
the challenged law. If a statute classifies individuals on the basis of

26. See infra Parts I.A–B.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
28. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (concluding that “State action of
every kind” is subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The
most obvious form of state action is passing, amending, or implementing a state law. See,
e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (holding that no state may pass election
laws that violate the Equal Protection Clause). An executive order is also a form of state
action, as it has the same force of a law although it involves no action by the state legislature. See, e.g., Ill. State Emps. Ass’n v. Walker, 315 N.E.2d 9, 10–13 (Ill. 1974) (determining
that the Illinois governor’s executive order requiring state employees to file financial disclosure statements did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
29. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (discussing strict scrutiny for laws that make classifications based on race, alienage, and national origin); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 & n.3 (1976) (explaining that
strict scrutiny must be applied to laws interfering with fundamental rights, such as voting).
30. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“[Such] laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will
be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”).
31. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (striking down a Virginia miscegenation law using strict scrutiny). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
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gender or illegitimacy, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny and will be
upheld if the state can prove that it is substantially related to an im32
portant state interest. This burden on the state is not as high as the
burden for strict scrutiny, but still often results in invalidation of the
33
challenged law. Any statute that does not require more stringent
34
scrutiny is subject to rational basis review. Under this standard, a
statute is entitled to a presumption of validity if the classification it
35
draws is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. To overcome
this presumption, the challenger has the burden of negating all pos36
sible rational justifications for the classification. Thus, rational basis
37
review is very deferential to the state.
Part I.A.1 discusses undocumented immigrants’ frequent but often unsuccessful attempts to argue for heightened scrutiny based on
38
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Plyler v. Doe, the first and only time
215–16, 218–20 (1944) (upholding an executive order to intern Japanese-Americans during World War II using strict scrutiny).
32. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (reasoning that illegitimacy warranted intermediate scrutiny because it is “a characteristic determined by causes not within the control
of the illegitimate individual” and imposing disabilities on an illegitimate child defies the
basic principle that “legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519, 534 (1996) (concluding that
the State of Virginia failed to provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding women from the Virginia Military Institute).
34. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (noting that the general rule of rational basis review
gives way only to the narrow categories that trigger heightened scrutiny).
35. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“State legislatures are
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice,
their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”).
36. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (“The
burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable
basis which might support it.” (citation omitted)).
37. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 298–99, 304–05 (1976) (per
curiam) (determining a city ordinance, which prohibited new food cart vendors from operating in New Orleans’ French Quarter, was rationally related to a legitimate state interest—preserving the appearance of the area).
38. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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the Court has ruled on an equal protection challenge brought by un39
documented immigrants. Part I.A.2 discusses commonly proffered
state interests in restricting undocumented immigrants from obtaining driver’s licenses and courts’ repeated deference to the state.
1. Level of Scrutiny Used for Equal Protection Challenges to
Immigrant-Restrictive Driver’s License Laws Brought by
Undocumented Immigrants
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Equal Protection Clause protects “all persons within the territorial jurisdiction [of
the United States], without regard to any differences of race, of color,
40
or of nationality . . . .” In striking down a Texas statute that denied
41
free public education to children who were in the country illegally,
the Court in Plyler acknowledged for the first time in American jurisprudence that the Equal Protection Clause protects undocumented
42
43
immigrants. The Court rejected a strict scrutiny analysis, but it required the State of Texas to demonstrate more than a rational basis
44
for the challenged statute. According to the Court, Texas failed to
show that denying “innocent children the free public education that
it offers to other children residing within its borders furthers some
45
substantial state interest.” Although the Court did not acknowledge

39. See id. at 205 (“The question presented . . . is whether, consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas may deny to undocumented
school-age children the free public education that it provides to children who are citizens
of the United States or legally admitted aliens.”).
40. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
41. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205, 230–31.
42. See id. at 215 (“That a person’s initial entry into a State, or into the United States,
was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact
of his presence within the State’s territorial perimeter. . . . And until he leaves the jurisdiction . . . he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws . . . .”).
43. See id. at 219 n.19 (“We reject the claim that ‘illegal aliens’ are a ‘suspect class.’ . . .
Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class,
by virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action. Indeed, entry into
the class is itself a crime. In addition, it could hardly be suggested that undocumented
status is a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’”).
44. See id. at 224 (“[T]he discrimination contained in [the Texas statute] can hardly
be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State.” (emphasis added)).
45. Id. at 230.
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it at the time, it is now widely understood that the Court used inter46
mediate scrutiny to reach its decision.
Based on the Court’s analysis in Plyler, undocumented immigrants have often argued that strict scrutiny, or at least intermediate
scrutiny, is the proper level of scrutiny to use for an equal protection
47
analysis of immigrant-restrictive driver’s license laws. Courts, however, have generally refused to extend Plyler any further than its limited
facts. Instead, courts have used rational basis review and, accordingly,
have upheld the state laws. For example, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia in John Doe No. 1 v. Georgia Department
48
of Public Safety underscored the distinction the Plyler Court drew between “illegal aliens and their children”: the parents voluntarily decided to enter the class of undocumented immigrants, while it was be49
yond the children’s control. Quoting Plyler, the court said:
Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may
withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence
within the United States is the product of their own unlawful
conduct. These arguments do not apply with the same force
to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children
46. See, e.g., Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1464–65 (9th Cir. 1985) (reading
Plyler as using intermediate scrutiny); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen
(LULAC I), No. 3:04–0613, 2004 WL 3048724, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004) (noting
that some commentators have read Plyler as using intermediate scrutiny); see also infra notes
54, 57.
47. See, e.g., LULAC I, 2004 WL 3048724, at *3 (“Plaintiffs argue that strict scrutiny
analysis, or at the very least, intermediate scrutiny analysis, is required by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe . . . .”); Doe v. Edgar, No. 88 C 579, 1989 WL 91805, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1989) (“The plaintiffs, in reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Plyler, argue for the application of the intermediate standard of review . . . .”); Cubas v.
Martinez, 819 N.Y.S.2d 10, 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (noting plaintiffs’ reliance on Plyler in
their equal protection challenge), aff’d, 870 N.E.2d 133 (N.Y. 2007). Undocumented immigrants have also argued for strict scrutiny under the fundamental right to travel; courts,
however, have quickly dismissed such claims. See, e.g., LULAC I, 2004 WL 3048724, at *4
(“[G]iven their status, illegal aliens do not have a constitutional right to move freely about
the country or the state.”); John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d
1369, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“Illegal aliens are subject to immediate arrest and ultimate
deportation. It strains all bounds of logic and reason to say that such a person has a fundamental right of interstate travel.”); see also Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding no “fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle”).
48. 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
49. Id. at 1372–73.
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of such illegal entrants. At the least, those who elect to enter
our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be
prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not limited to, deportation. But the children of those illegal en50
trants are not comparably situated.
The court used this reasoning to stress that the undocumented
immigrants challenging an immigrant-restrictive Georgia driver’s li51
52
cense law were not a suspect class. The U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee in League of United Latin American Citizens
53
v. Bredesen (LULAC I) also used the same distinction to reject the
plaintiffs’ claim that a strict scrutiny analysis was warranted for a Tennessee law limiting undocumented immigrants to temporary driving
54
certificates rather than driver’s licenses. Similarly, New York’s in55
termediate court in Cubas v. Martinez distinguished Plyler by emphasizing that the undocumented immigrants challenging an immigrant56
restrictive New York driver’s license law were all adults, not innocent
50. Id. at 1373 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219–20 (1982)).
51. The challenged Georgia law forbade anyone not a U.S. citizen or a legally authorized alien from obtaining a Georgia driver’s license. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-1(15)(B)
(2011) (stating that only U.S. citizens or legally authorized aliens may be Georgia residents); Id. § 40-5-20(a) (2011) (“Any person who is a resident of this state for 30 days shall
obtain a Georgia driver’s license before operating a motor vehicle in this state.”).
52. See John Doe No. 1, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1373 (“Following Plyler, it is clear that illegal
aliens are not a ‘suspect class’ that would subject the Georgia statute to strict scrutiny.”).
53. No. 3:04-0613, 2004 WL 3048724 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004).
54. Id. at *1, *4–5 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004) (“Membership in this class is voluntary,
and does not resemble the class of children described in Plyler. Therefore, the heightened
scrutiny analysis that was applied in Plyler is not warranted here.”). The challenged Tennessee law allowed undocumented immigrants to receive a driving certificate valid for one
year, while those lawfully present could receive a driving certificate valid for up to five
years. Id. at *1. Only U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents could receive Tennessee driver’s licenses. Id. Note that, under current Tennessee law, only lawfully present
immigrants are eligible for temporary driver’s licenses; the law no longer makes reference
to driving certificates. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 55-50-331(g) (2012). It is still the case that only U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents may receive permanent driver’s licenses.
Id. § 55-50-321(c)(1)(C) (2012).
55. 819 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13–14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006), aff’d, 870 N.E.2d 133 (N.Y. 2007).
56. The challenged New York law required a social security number to obtain a driver’s license. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 502(1) (2011). On its face, the law did not discriminate against a particular class, but because undocumented immigrants do not have social
security numbers, the law, by its terms, drew a distinction between those illegally and legal-
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58

children. Finally, in Doe v. Edgar, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois distinguished Plyler by comparing the lifetime hardship caused by the deprivation of a free basic education with
59
the marginal harm caused by the deprivation of a driver’s license.
At least one court has applied strict scrutiny in an equal protection analysis of an immigrant-restrictive driver’s license law, although
60
61
its decision was later overturned. In People v. Quiroga-Puma, an undocumented immigrant was charged with unlicensed operation of a
62
motor vehicle and failure to provide proof of valid insurance. The
New York Justice Court for the Village of Westbury raised, sua sponte,
an equal protection challenge of the immigrant-restrictive New York
statute that prevented the defendant from obtaining a driver’s license
63
in the first place. Although the court only cited and did not actually
64
rely on Plyler, it found that the defendant was a member of a suspect
65
The court stressed that because immigrants cannot vote,
class.

ly in the country. See Cubas, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 13–15 (quoting the challenged law, which
makes no reference to a particular class of persons, but explaining that “only applicants
who are authorized to remain in the country for more than one year . . . are generally eligible for licensing”).
57. Cubas, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 24 (“[T]he [Plyler] Court seems to have reasoned that
somewhat stricter scrutiny was required because the children of undocumented aliens lack
any control over their illegal entry into the United States. Here, plaintiffs are all adults.”
(citations omitted)).
58 No. 88 C 579, 1989 WL 91805 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1989).
59. Id. at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1989) (“[T]he harm caused by the deprivation of a drivers license, while not insubstantial, pales in comparison to the extreme harm caused by the
denial of a basic education.”).
60. See infra note 68.
61. 848 N.Y.S.2d 853 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2007), rev’d, 884 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. App. Term
2009).
62. Id. at 854–55.
63. Id. at 856–57, 859. “The Commissioner [of the Department of Motor Vehicles]
has in fact set requirements in such a way that VTL § 502-1 discriminates against undocumented aliens. It is impossible for an undocumented immigrant to prove their identity
under the current scheme established by the Commissioner.” Id. at 862. The challenged
New York law is the same as in Cubas. See supra note 56.
64. Quiroga-Puma, 848 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
65. Id. at 862 (“The Court finds that the defendant is a member of a suspect class. He
is an alien, and a non-citizen. As such, he triggers the appropriate consideration under
Equal Protection analysis.”).
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66

“[t]hey are silenced and shut out of our legal debate.” According to
the court, this fact undermines any argument that undocumented
immigrants are not a suspect class since they do not have the political
67
power to protect themselves. Thus, the court applied strict scrutiny
and found the challenged New York statute violated the Equal Protec68
tion Clause. With the exception of this court, though, most courts
have indicated that the heightened scrutiny used for the undocumented immigrants in Plyler is fairly limited in application. Accordingly, equal protection challenges to immigrant-restrictive driver’s license laws brought by undocumented immigrants have only been
afforded rational basis review.
2. State Interests in Denying Driver’s Licenses to Undocumented
Immigrants
Once a court rejects a heightened level of scrutiny for an immigrant-restrictive driver’s license law, it will uphold the law if the classi69
fication drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. In
Doe No. 1, the court recognized three legitimate state interests in
Georgia’s immigrant-restrictive driver’s license law: (1) preventing
governmental machinery from facilitating the concealment of illegal
aliens; (2) preserving scarce resources by not giving driving tests to il-

66. Id. at 863–64.
67. See id. (“This particular fact is most important—they cannot better their situation
and must rely on citizens to take up their causes.”).
68. Id. at 865. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term reversed the justice
court on the grounds that it should not have raised constitutional claims sua sponte, when
there was no evidence that the defendant had standing to assert the claims raised on his
behalf:
[T]he record does not indicate that defendant ever applied for a driver’s license
and, even assuming that he did apply and was denied a license, that the grounds
for the denial were unrelated to age, the ability to pass the visual, written and
performance test requirements, or some other civil or physical impediment to
obtaining a license that is unrelated to the constitutional issues herein raised,
much less that the denial was, in fact, based on his failure to produce the required documentation. It is axiomatic that there is no standing to complain
where an alleged defect in or violation of a statute does not injure the party seeking redress . . . .
People v. Quiroga-Puma, 884 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568–69 (N.Y. App. Term 2009) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
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legal aliens subject to immediate deportation; and (3) promoting
economic safety because “persons subject to immediate deportation
will not be financially responsible for property damage or personal in70
jury” resulting from car accidents. Thus, the court did not find the
71
72
law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In Sanchez v. State,
a class action lawsuit brought by undocumented immigrants and li73
censed drivers against Iowa’s immigrant-restrictive driver’s license
74
law, the State of Iowa proffered the same or similar interests as
Georgia plus more: (1) preventing its governmental machinery from
facilitating the concealment of illegal aliens; (2) limiting Iowa’s services to citizens and legal residents; (3) restricting Iowa driver’s licenses to those who are not subject to deportation; and (4) discourag75
ing illegal immigration. The Supreme Court of Iowa found that the
76
plaintiffs did not sufficiently negate the first proffered interest; thus
77
it did not reach the legitimacy of the other three interests. Accordingly, the court did not find the law in violation of the Equal Protec78
tion Clause.

70. John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga.
2001).
71. See id. (“[The law] is a legitimate exercise of the police power . . . .”).
72. 692 N.W.2d 812 (Iowa 2005).
73. Id. at 815 (“Juan and Maria Sanchez represent a class of illegal, undocumented
aliens present in the state who want to obtain driver’s licenses. John and Jane Doe represent a class of licensed drivers in the state who want the [Iowa Department of Transportation] to license the Sanchez class to make it safer for members of the Doe class to drive on
the state’s roads.”).
74. The challenged Iowa law, like in Cubas and Quiroga-Puma, required driver’s license
applicants to provide social security numbers. IOWA CODE § 321.182(1)(a) (2009). Iowa’s
Department of Transportation could waive this requirement, id., but only for immigrants
who were authorized by the federal government to be in the country. Id. § 321.196(1).
Undocumented immigrants, consequently, could not obtain Iowa driver’s licenses.
75. Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 818.
76. Id. at 819; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
77. Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 819 (“We conclude the state’s licensing scheme is rationally
related to the legitimate state interest of not allowing its governmental machinery to be a
facilitator for the concealment of illegal aliens. Thus, the classes have failed to carry their
burden of negating all reasonable bases that could justify the challenged statute. Furthermore, we need not address the legitimacy of the other state interests proffered in this
case.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
78. Id.
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The court in Cubas found that New York’s “successful regulation
of motor vehicle operations and the assurance of the integrity of identification documents” were legitimate state interests advanced by its
79
immigrant-restrictive driver’s license law. The court explained that
the new identification procedures “serve a vital governmental purpose
in preventing the abuse of identification documents to commit acts of
fraud or, as tragically illustrated by the events of September 11, 2001,
80
acts of terrorism.” Similarly, in LULAC I, the court found that “making the state safe from crime and terrorism” was a legitimate basis for
Tennessee’s law limiting undocumented immigrants and temporary
81
legal aliens to temporary driving certificates. Both courts found that
82
the state laws did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
In contrast, the court applying strict scrutiny in Quiroga-Puma did
not find the two state interests raised sua sponte—national security
and the economy—compelling enough to justify denying driver’s li83
censes to undocumented immigrants. Although the court acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of national security as a
84
compelling state interest, it reasoned that:
Curtailing the action of immigrants by not permitting them
to drive has no rational connection to national security. If
anything, granting licenses to drive increases our domestic
safety by insuring that immigrants are certified to drive.
Denying immigrants, regardless of their legal status, a driv-

79. Cubas v. Martinez, 819 N.Y.S.2d 10, 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006), aff’d, 870 N.E.2d 133
(N.Y. 2007).
80. Id. at 25.
81. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC I), No. 3:04–0613, 2004
WL 3048724, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004). “The State of Tennessee contends that
homeland security is the basis for limiting illegal aliens and temporary legal aliens to issuance of a drivers’ certificate covering a shorter period of time than a drivers’ license, and
stating on the face of the certificate ‘not valid for identification.’” Id. at *5.
82. Id. at *6; Cubas, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 24. The Cubas court was “not unsympathetic” to
otherwise law-abiding undocumented immigrants who, without driver’s licenses, “face[]
difficulty in pursuing employment, commuting to a place of employment or elsewhere, or
obtaining financial or other services.” Id. at 25. The court, however, found the State’s interest in verifying identity outweighed the plaintiffs’ inconvenience in not being able to
obtain driver’s licenses. Id.
83. People v. Quiroga-Puma, 848 N.Y.S.2d 853, 864–65 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2007), rev’d, 884
N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. App. Term 2009).
84. Id. at 864 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
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er’s license in no way constitutes a necessary means for
85
achieving national security.
The court found economic arguments, such as undocumented
immigrants taking away jobs from U.S. citizens, equally unpersuasive;
moreover, “the Supreme Court has been silent on the issue of whether the economic concerns of a state government, much less the con86
cerns of public opinion, qualify as a compelling state interest.”
Again, with the exception of this decision, courts have indicated that
state interests in crime prevention, national security, and state resource preservation satisfy rational basis review.
B. Pre-emption Challenges
The Supremacy Clause provides that the United States Constitution, and laws and treaties made pursuant to it, “shall be the supreme
87
Law of the Land.” The Supreme Court has declared: “[U]nder the
Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived,
any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power,
88
which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.” The
Court has recognized three major ways of finding pre-emption: (1) a
89
federal law expressly pre-empts a state or local law; (2) federal regu90
lation has wholly occupied a field; or (3) a state law conflicts with
federal law—either the state law makes it physically impossible to
comply with federal law, or the state law frustrates the objectives of a

85. Id. at 865.
86. Id. at 864.
87. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
88. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500–01 (2012) (“There is no doubt
that Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision.”); Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (“Pre-emption may be either
expressed or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in
the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
90. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502 (“Field preemption reflects a congressional decision
to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.”);
Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (“[F]ield preemption [occurs] where the scheme of federal regulation
is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it . . . .” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2013]

DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS

947

91

federal scheme.
There is, however, a presumption against preemption of state laws that regulate a field the states have traditionally
92
93
occupied. Arizona v. United States —the Court’s most recent articulation of its pre-emption doctrine in the area of immigration law—
94
helped define these principles. There, the Court considered four
provisions of Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act, a state immigration enforcement policy commonly known as S.B. 1070, and found all but one pre-empted by fed95
eral immigration law.
Part I.B.1 discusses unsuccessful attempts to argue that preemption principles bar immigrant-restrictive driver’s license laws because the federal government has exclusive authority over regulating
96
immigration. Part I.B.2 discusses the Real ID Act, a federal licensing
91. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (maintaining that conflict pre-emption occurs where
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility” and where
state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gade,
505 U.S. at 98 (same); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (recognizing that a “‘[c]onflict in
technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy’” (quoting Motor Coach Emps. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971))).
92. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (“In preemption analysis, courts should assume that
‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947))).
93 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
94. Id. at 2500–05.
95. Id. at 2497, 2510. Section 3, which created a new state misdemeanor for failing to
carry registration papers, was found pre-empted because the Court concluded that Congress intended to wholly occupy the field of alien registration and foreclose any state regulation in the area. Id. at 2501–03. Section 5(C), which likewise created a new state misdemeanor for working without proper authorization, was found pre-empted as frustrating
federal objectives. Id. at 2503–05. According to the Court, Congress debated, discussed,
and ultimately rejected proposals to make such conduct a criminal offense. Id. at 2504.
Section 6, which authorized state officers to make warrantless arrests for removable offenses, was found pre-empted for similar reasons: the Court found that it created an obstacle
to Congress’s objectives by providing state officers wide, unilateral authority to arrest immigrants without any input from or cooperation with the federal government. Id. at 2505–
07. The only provision upheld was section 2(B), also known as the “Show Me Your Papers”
provision, which requires state officers to investigate the immigration status of suspected
undocumented persons. Id. at 2507–10.
96. Note that these cases were decided before the Real ID Act was passed.
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scheme passed by Congress in 2005, which likely complicates preemption challenges.
1. Failed Pre-emption Challenges to Immigrant-Restrictive Driver’s
License Laws
Although the power of the federal government to regulate immi97
gration has long been established, courts have consistently denied
pre-emption challenges to immigrant-restrictive driver’s license laws.
For example, the plaintiff in Doe No. 1 argued that the U.S. Constitution pre-empts the entire field of immigration law, and thus a Georgia
law restricting undocumented immigrants from obtaining a Georgia
98
driver’s license should be pre-empted. The court disagreed, reasoning that “the Georgia statutes mirror federal objectives by denying
Georgia driver’s licenses to those who are in this country illegally ac99
cording to federal law.” Moreover, “[i]t is a legitimate exercise of
the police power to regulate and supervise those authorized to exercise the privilege of driving automobiles on the highways of Geor100
gia.” Based on this reasoning, the court declined to find the Geor101
gia statute pre-empted.
Similarly in LULAC I, the plaintiffs argued that the federal government’s regulation of immigration pre-empted Tennessee’s immi102
The court found otherwise,
grant-restrictive driver’s license laws.
reasoning that the Tennessee legislation did not attempt to regulate
immigration; rather, it “relie[d] on federal immigration standards in
determining whether a person is eligible for a drivers’ license or a
103
Furthermore, the court reasoned that “there
drivers’ certificate.”
[was] no indication that the federal government intend[ed] to com-

97. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (“Our cases have long recognized the
preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within
our borders.” (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 377–80 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 418–20 (1948);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–68 (1941); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915)).
98. John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1375–76 (N.D.
Ga. 2001).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1376.
101. Id.
102. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC I), No. 3:04–0613, 2004
WL 3048724, at *6–7 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004).
103. Id.
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pletely occupy the field of drivers’ license issuance for immigrants” as
104
this function “has traditionally been left to state governments.” Accordingly, the court declined to find the Tennessee statutes pre105
empted. Such cases demonstrate the tendency of courts to deny the
argument that federal immigration laws pre-empt immigrantrestrictive state driver’s license laws, focusing instead on how such
laws complement federal law.
2. The Real ID Act
The issuance of driver’s licenses has traditionally been a state
106
function. Prior to September 11, 2001, the prevailing view was that
107
This view
each state determined its own issuance standards.
changed when the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States recommended that “[t]he federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth certifi108
In recates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses.”
109
This Act
response, Congress passed the Real ID Act in May 2005.
provides federal standards for issuing driver’s licenses and identifica110
tion cards, including minimum issuance standards and evidence of

104. Id. at *7; see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
105. LULAC I, 2004 WL 3048724, at *6–7.
106. See United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[T]here is little
question that licensing of drivers constitutes an integral portion of those governmental
services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their
citizens.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also ALISON M. SMITH,
CONG. RES. SERV., RL 32127, SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS ON THE ISSUANCE OF DRIVER’S
LICENSES TO UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS 1 (2004), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&d
id=450403 (“Eligibility for driver’s licenses is first and foremost a matter of state law.”).
107. TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RES. SERV., RL 34430, THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005:
LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 1 (2008), available at http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34430.pdf.
108. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 390 (2004), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-911REPORT/pdf/GPO-911REPORT.pdf.
109. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 201–07, 119 Stat. 231, 310–16 (2005) [hereinafter Real ID Act] (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301).
110. Before they can issue a driver’s license or identification card, states are required,
at a minimum, to verify: (1) a photo or non-photo document that includes the legal name
and date of birth of the individual; (2) a valid document stating the date of birth of the
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111

lawful status.
The Act wholly restricts undocumented immigrants
from obtaining driver’s licenses and limits certain noncitizens, includ112
ing deferred action recipients, to temporary driver’s licenses.
individual; (3) a valid social security number or an explanation of non-eligibility for a social security number; and (4) a valid document showing the address and name of the individual at their principal residence. Id. at § 202(c)(1).
111. The Act states:
A State shall require, before issuing a driver’s license or identification card to a
person, valid documentary evidence that the person—(i) is a citizen or national
of the United States; (ii) is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent or temporary residence in the United States; (iii) has conditional permanent resident status in the United States; (iv) has an approved application for asylum in the United States or has entered into the United States in refugee status; (v) has a valid,
unexpired nonimmigrant visa or nonimmigrant visa status for entry into the
United States; (vi) has a pending application for asylum in the United States;
(vii) has a pending or approved application for temporary protected status in the
United States; (viii) has approved deferred action status; or (ix) has a pending application for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resident in the United States or conditional permanent resident status in
the United States.
Id. § 202(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
112. See id. § 202(c)(2)(C) (allowing only individuals with statuses in clauses (v)
through (ix) in § 202(c)(2)(B), supra note 111, to receive a temporary driver’s license or
temporary identification card set to expire on the date the individuals’ authorized stay in
the United States expires). Currently, only two states—Washington and New Mexico—
allow any qualified driver to obtain a driver’s license, regardless of their immigration status. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-9(B) (2011) (allowing driver’s license applicants to provide
a tax identification number in lieu of a social security number); Proof of Identity, WASH. ST.
DEP’T OF LICENSING, http://www.dol.wa.gov/driverslicense/idproof.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2013) (allowing driver’s license applicants to provide proof of Washington residence in
lieu of a social security number). Utah allows those who cannot prove lawful presence to
obtain “Driving Privilege Cards,” though “DPCs” cannot be used for identification purposes. See Driver License Division - Obtaining a Utah Driving Privilege Card (DPC), UTAH DEP’T OF
PUB. SAFETY, http://publicsafety.utah.gov/dld/drivingprivilegecard.html (last updated
Mar. 8, 2013). Earlier this year, Illinois passed a bill that allows undocumented immigrants to obtain temporary driver’s licenses. S.B. 957, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013), available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=957&GAID=11&DocType
ID=SB&SessionID=84&GA=97. Likewise, Maryland recently passed a bill that repeals a lawful status requirement for driver’s license applications. H.B. 789, 433rd Gen. Assemb.
(Md. 2013), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2013RS/bills/hb/hb0789f.pdf.
Other states are considering similar legislation. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 60, 2013–2014 Leg.,
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State compliance with the Real ID Act is voluntary. 113 If states opt
not to comply with the federal standards, however, their state driver’s
114
licenses will not be recognized for federal identification purposes.
Moreover, non-compliant states will not participate in the infor115
mation-sharing system the Real ID Act purports to create. Residents
of non-compliant states may run into problems if their driver’s licens116
Although
es are not accepted in compliant states, and vice versa.
there are strong incentives for states to comply with the Real ID Act
for the convenience of their residents, many states have nonetheless
117
opposed it; states might regard the Real ID Act as an impractical
118
and unfunded mandate.
Among other things, the Real ID Act has caused concern over
whether it pre-empts state laws that set contrary standards for the is119
Given the voluntary nasuance of driver’s licenses to immigrants.
ture of the Real ID Act, the decision to issue or not to issue driver’s
120
At
licenses to immigrants should remain entirely with the states.
least one court, however, used the Real ID Act to pre-empt an immigrant-restrictive state driver’s license law. In League of United Latin

Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (proposing to repeal provisions of existing law that require proof of
lawful presence); S.B. 68, 2013 Gen Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013) (proposing to allow
qualified Connecticut residents to obtain driver’s licenses regardless of immigration status).
113. See Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 202(a) (providing the process by which the Department of Homeland Security determines whether states complied with the requirements of the Act); TATELMAN, supra note 107, at 19 (stating that the REAL ID Act is not
binding on states).
114. See Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 202(a)(1) (“[A] Federal agency may not accept,
for any official purpose, a driver’s license or identification card issued by a State . . . unless
the State is meeting the requirements of this section.”). For example, residents of noncompliant states cannot use their state driver’s licenses to board airplanes or enter federal
buildings. TATELMAN, supra note 107, at 19.
115. TATELMAN, supra note 107, at 20.
116. See id. at 19–20 (discussing possible ramifications for residents of non-compliant
states).
117. See id. at 17–19 (discussing states’ opposition to the Real ID Act).
118. See What’s Wrong with REAL ID?, REALNIGHTMARE.ORG, www.realnightmare.org
(last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (describing the costs of the Real ID Act).
119. See TATELMAN, supra note 107 at 29–30 (addressing whether states still have ultimate control over the issuance of driver’s licenses with the Real ID Act in place).
120. Id. at 30.
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121

American Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC II), the plaintiffs challenged a
Tennessee statute that prohibited using matrícula consular cards as
122
proof of identification for obtaining a Tennessee driver’s license.
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee found
that the Real ID Act, which similarly forbids using matrícula consular
123
cards, pre-empted the Tennessee statute, rendering the lawsuit
124
Although the Real ID Act is voluntary, the court reasoned,
moot.
non-compliant states’ driver’s licenses “could not be used to access
federal facilities, board federally regulated commercial aircraft, or for
‘any other purposes the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall de125
termine,’” and thus “states are likely to comply with the Act.”
“[G]iven the broad scope of the phrase ‘official purpose’ for which
compliance with the Act is required, and that the federal interest in
national security is one of the goals of the Act,” the court concluded
that “Congress intended to preempt state law in this area of identity
126
Thus, the court
verification documentation for drivers’ licenses.”
upheld the pre-emption challenge and, in so doing, upheld the re127
This reasoning has not been used often,
striction on immigrants.
128
but with an increasing number of Real ID-compliant states, it is likely that pre-emption challenges focusing on the federal licensing
scheme, rather than the federal immigration scheme, will arise.

121. No. 3:04-0613, 2005 WL 2034935 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 23, 2005).
122. Id. at *1; TENN. CODE ANN. 55-50-321(g) (2012) (“The department [of motor vehicles] shall not accept matricula consular cards as proof of identification for driver license application and issuance purposes.”). Matrícula consular cards are identification
cards issued by the Mexican Government to Mexican nationals residing outside of Mexico.
KEVIN O’NEIL, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., CONSULAR ID CARDS: MEXICO AND BEYOND (Apr.
2003), available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=115.
123. See Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 202(c)(3)(B) (providing that complying states,
in deciding whether to issue driver’s licenses, shall not accept any foreign documents other than official passports).
124. LULAC II, 2005 WL 2034935, at *1, *3.
125. Id. at *2 (quoting Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 201(3)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at *3.
128. DHS Determines 13 States Meet REAL ID Standards, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/12/20/dhs-determines-13-states-meetreal-id-standards.
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II. ANALYSIS
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the federal and
state governments acted quickly to strengthen security laws, including
restricting immigrants’ ability to obtain driver’s licenses. 129 Numerous
states passed laws restricting immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses
130
specifically for security purposes. The Real ID Act represented the
peak of these restrictions, as it limited many noncitizens to temporary
driver’s licenses and prohibited undocumented immigrants from ob131
taining driver’s licenses altogether.
The new Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program raises
a new question in the debate over licensing immigrants—whether
states should allow DACA beneficiaries to obtain driver’s licenses.
Parts II.A and II.B discuss equal protection arguments and preemption arguments, respectively, that support the issuance of driver’s
licenses to DACA beneficiaries and suggests why states that deny driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries erred. Likewise, Part II.C addresses policy arguments for why states that allow DACA beneficiaries to
obtain driver’s licenses are headed in the right direction.

129. See, e.g., Immigrant Driver’s License Restrictions Challenged In Some States, IMMIGRANTS’
RTS. UPDATE (Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr., Los Angeles, Cal.), Oct. 21, 2002, at 13 (“Nationwide,
approximately 63 bills introduced during the 2001–02 state legislative sessions addressed
immigrants’ ability to obtain a driver’s license . . . . [A]lmost 50 of these proposals sought
to limit access for immigrants . . . .”); see also H.R. 4633, 107th Cong. (2002) (requiring
that a computer chip be embedded in a driver’s license or identification card with encoded biometric data matching the license holder). With widespread attention on terrorists’
ability to obtain driver’s licenses, it is often overlooked that all of the 9/11 terrorists could
have gotten through airport security using their Saudi passports. Margaret D. Stock, License Policy a Win for Security, NEWSDAY (Oct. 1. 2007, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsday.com/
opinion/license-policy-a-win-for-security-1.667541.
130. See, e.g., Jewish Cmty. Action v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 657 N.W.2d 604, 606, 609
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“The [Minnesota Department of Public Safety] determined that
the rules [requiring driver’s license applicants to prove lawful presence in the United
States] will tighten homeland security in Minnesota, noting that some of the terrorist activity in the United States is carried out by foreign nationals and that many foreign nationals
are illegally present in this country.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also supra
notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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A. Equal Protection Arguments as Applied to DACA Beneficiaries
The success of an equal protection challenge to a state restriction 132 on issuing driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries depends
in large part on the level of scrutiny a court uses and the interests the
133
Part II.A.1 analogizes the position of DACA benefistate proffers.
ciaries to the position of undocumented children in Plyler and underscores why this comparison would likely lead a court to apply intermediate scrutiny to the state restriction. Part II.A.2 highlights why
past state interests in denying driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants are inapplicable to the case of DACA beneficiaries.
1. State Driver’s License Restrictions on DACA Beneficiaries Should
Be Afforded Intermediate Scrutiny
Most courts have distinguished Plyler on the grounds that undocumented immigrants denied driver’s licenses are not similarly situated
to the innocent children in Plyler who were denied a free public edu134
DACA beneficiaries, however, are similarly situated to the
cation.
Plyler children. The court in Doe No. 1 reasoned that the children in
135
Plyler could not affect “their parents’ conduct []or their own status.”
Similarly, DACA is directed at undocumented immigrants who were
136
brought into the United States as children by their parents, bearing
virtually no responsibility for their undocumented status. In fact, one
of the objective threshold requirements for DACA is that the appli132. A state restriction can be a law, executive order, or any other form of state action
that is subject to the Equal Protection Clause. See supra note 28.
133. See supra notes 29–37 and accompanying text.
134. See supra Part I.A.1.
135. John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1372–73 (N.D.
Ga. 2001) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r of U.S. Customs and Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir. of
U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., and John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigr. and Customs
Enforcement (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf

(“By

this

memorandum, I am setting forth how, in the exercise of our prosecutorial discretion, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should enforce the Nation’s immigration laws
against certain young people who were brought to this country as children and know only
this country as home.”). An argument could be made that DACA beneficiaries are similarly situated to illegitimate children, a classification that has traditionally been afforded intermediate scrutiny. See supra note 32.
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cant must have entered the United States before age sixteen.
A
court analyzing an equal protection challenge of a state driver’s license restriction on DACA beneficiaries would likely make this comparison and, accordingly, apply intermediate scrutiny to the restriction.
In addition, DACA beneficiaries are technically documented;
they have provided ample documentation to the federal government
to meet DACA eligibility requirements and, for this reason, are not
138
Courts that have used rational
subject to immediate deportation.
basis review for driver’s license laws restricting undocumented immigrants were considering cases where the plaintiffs never submitted
139
documentation to, nor were cleared by, the federal government.
Thus, DACA beneficiaries are different from the plaintiffs in those
cases.
Although there are obvious similarities between the Plyler plaintiffs and DACA beneficiaries, a court would likely emphasize the differences between the benefit denied—a free basic education versus a
driver’s license. The Plyler Court equally focused on the innocent
children harmed and the education they were denied, noting that
“[t]he inestimable toll of that deprivation [of education] on the social
economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual . . . ma[de] it most difficult to reconcile” an immigration statusbased denial of basic education with the equality guaranteed in the
140
As the court articulated in Edgar, “the
Equal Protection Clause.
harm caused by the deprivation of a drivers license . . . pales in comparison to the extreme harm caused by the denial of a basic educa141
While this distinction may hold weight in theory, in reality,
tion.”
being unable to drive often translates into lack of access to better
schools, better jobs, better health care, and even better grocery
142
stores, especially in rural areas where public transportation is either
137. See supra text accompanying note 3.
138. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
139. See supra Part I.A.1.
140. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982).
141. Doe v. Edgar, No. 88 C 579, 1989 WL 91895, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1989).
142. See María Pabón López, More Than a License to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of
Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91, 96–97 (2004) (asserting that because the
automobile is “the most important mode of transportation in the United States, the lack of
a driver’s license directly threatens [immigrants’] livelihood”); Gregory A. Odegaard, A Yes
or No Answer: A Plea to End the Oversimplification of the Debate on Licensing Aliens, 24 J.L. &
POL. 435, 448 (2008) (“[O]utside of a few metropolitan areas, it is difficult, if not impossi-
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inadequate or non-existent.
In the end, those who are denied a
144
driver’s license are also being denied access to better opportunities.
The negative impact of being denied a driver’s license therefore does
not “pale in comparison” to being denied a basic education, but rather is indirectly similar.
2. Past State Interests in Denying Driver’s Licenses to Undocumented
Immigrants Are Inapplicable to the Case of DACA Beneficiaries
Most courts have consistently found legitimate state interests in
145
denying driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants; these interests, however, do not apply to DACA beneficiaries. For example, the
courts in Doe No. 1 and Sanchez found that preventing “governmental
machinery [from being] a facilitator for the concealment of illegal al146
iens” was a legitimate state interest. This interest is inapplicable to
DACA beneficiaries because, by nature of having applied for deferred
147
action status, they are not “concealed.” In fact, DACA operates as a
mechanism to encourage individuals to identify and document them148
selves. Moreover, there would be no reason for a DACA beneficiary
to attempt to conceal his identity when the federal government has
already verified his identity through the application process.
Similarly, the court in Cubas found “the assurance of the integrity
of identification documents” was a legitimate state interest in that the
challenged driver’s license law allowed the Department of Motor Vehicles “to verify that the applicant is, in fact, who s/he purports to

ble, to function in the United States without a car. . . . Prohibiting one from driving thus
diminishes her ability to participate in everyday life.”).
143. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273, 300–23 (2003) (discussing
how those living in rural areas are isolated from better jobs, schools, and services, all of
which is exacerbated by the lack of public transportation).
144. See id. (highlighting the opportunities available to those not limited to rural areas); see also supra note 82.
145. See supra Part I.A.2.
146. John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga.
2001); Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 818 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
147. DACA applicants must provide ample documentation to USCIS to meet DACA
eligibility criteria. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
148. For a description of the major benefits of the DACA program, see supra text accompanying note 2. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text for a description of the
DACA eligibility requirements.
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149

be.” This reasoning, again, does not apply with full effect to DACA
beneficiaries—not only because the federal government has verified
their identity, but also because the federal government, through the
Real ID Act, permits those with deferred action status to obtain a
150
Thus, there is little incentive for DACA
temporary driver’s license.
beneficiaries to use false documentation to obtain a driver’s license
when the federal government—the only entity that has the authority
to remove them from the country—has granted them deferred action
status.
State interests in national security are likewise inapplicable to the
case of DACA beneficiaries. The courts in Cubas and LULAC I both
found that the challenged driver’s license laws served a legitimate
151
state interest in preventing acts of crime and terrorism. DACA beneficiaries, by virtue of being granted deferred action status, have been
characterized by the federal government as nonthreats to national se152
curity or public safety. Thus, denying them driver’s licenses for national security purposes is not a legitimate state interest when the federal government has already determined the individual poses no
153
national security risk.
Finally, the courts in Doe No. 1 and Sanchez found that denying
driver’s licenses to those subject to immediate deportation was a legit154
imate economic interest of the state. The main purpose of granting
155
deferred action is to defer deportation; DACA beneficiaries, as long
as they obey the law (just like any other noncitizen), are protected

149. Cubas v. Martinez, 819 N.Y.S.2d 10, 20, 24–25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 870 N.E.2d 133 (N.Y. 2007).
150. Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 202(c)(2)(C).
151. See Cubas, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (noting that preventing fraud and terrorist acts “serve
a vital governmental purpose”); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC
I), No. 3:04–0613, 2004 WL 3048724, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004) (suggesting that
“making the state safe from crime and terrorism” provides a rational basis for Tennessee’s
immigrant-restrictive driver’s license law).
152. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
153. A court could follow the position of the court in Quiroga-Puma that denying driver’s licenses to immigrants has nothing to do with national security, see supra text accompanying note 85, though this view seems to be rare.
154. John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga.
2001); Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 818 (Iowa 2005).
155. See DACA Initiative, supra note 1 (“Deferred action is a discretionary determination to defer removal action of an individual as an act of prosecutorial discretion.”).

958

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:931

156

from deportation. This state interest, therefore, also does not apply
to DACA beneficiaries.
Although there are persuasive arguments for the inapplicability
of past state interests to the specific case of DACA beneficiaries, a
court using rational basis review may still uphold a state driver’s license restriction on DACA beneficiaries because of the extreme deference given to the state: state interests are deemed legitimate so long
157
But,
as a “state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”
taking into consideration the similarities between DACA beneficiaries
and the Plyler plaintiffs, and the differences between DACA beneficiaries and the plaintiffs in past cases where the court used rational
basis review, there are stronger arguments for the use of intermediate
158
scrutiny.
B. Pre-emption Arguments as Applied to DACA Beneficiaries
Pre-emption arguments generally fail when they seek to maintain
that states have no authority to promulgate immigrant-restrictive driver’s license laws because the federal government has exclusive author159
ity over immigration. The Real ID Act, however, provides a promising foundation for a pre-emption argument in the case of state
driver’s license restrictions on DACA beneficiaries. Out of the three
160
ways of finding pre-emption, only one is potentially viable. There is
no express pre-emption language in the Real ID Act, nor is the issu161
ance of driver’s licenses, unlike alien registration, a field in which
162
Congress sought to regulate wholly since it made the Act voluntary.
That leaves conflict pre-emption.
The first form of conflict pre-emption—physical impossibility—is
inapplicable; given that state compliance with federal standards is not

156. See id. (stating that DACA beneficiaries’ cases “will not be placed into removal proceedings or removed from the United States for a period of two years, unless terminated”
(emphasis added)).
157. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
158. See supra Part II.A.1.
159. See supra Part I.B.1.
160. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 95.
162. See supra notes 90, 113 and accompanying text. But see League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC II), No. 3:04–0613, 2005 WL 2034935, at *2 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 23, 2005) (holding that “Congress intended to preempt state law in this area of identity verification documentation for drivers’ licenses”).
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mandatory, a resident of a state can have a non-compliant driver’s license and use another form of accepted identification, such as a pass163
While this route is inconport, for federal identification purposes.
164
venient for residents of non-complying states, it is not physically imimpossible to comply with state and federal law.
The second form of conflict pre-emption—frustrates Congress’
objectives—provides a better argument. In the Real ID Act itself,
Congress recognized deferred action as a status in which one can get
165
Congress also referred to those with
a temporary driver’s license.
deferred action status as having “authorized stay”—that is, lawful
166
Thus, an argument can be made
presence, in the United States.
that Congress intended for persons with deferred action status to obtain driver’s licenses, and states that deny driver’s licenses to DACA
beneficiaries frustrate Congress’ objectives.
Conversely, the Real ID Act was a promulgation of federal driv167
er’s license issuance standards in the name of national security;
while Congress’ intent in the Real ID Act to allow those with deferred
action status to receive temporary driver’s licenses is fairly direct, the
argument that denying driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries frustrates Congress’ national security objectives is fairly attenuated, espe168
Moreover,
cially given that compliance with the Act is voluntary.
traditional state functions, such as issuing driver’s licenses, are afforded a presumption against pre-emption unless pre-emption was “the
169
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Nevertheless, USCIS’s recent interpretation of “lawful presence” as it relates to DACA benefi-

163. TATELMAN, supra note 107, at 19.
164. Id.
165. Real ID Act, supra note 109, § 202(c)(2)(C)(i).
166. See id. § 202(c)(2)(C)(ii) (“A temporary driver’s license or temporary identification card issued pursuant to this subparagraph shall be valid only during the period of
time of the applicant’s authorized stay in the United States or, if there is no definite end to the
period of authorized stay, a period of one year.” (emphasis added)).
167. See TATELMAN, supra note 107, at 3 (explaining that provisions of the Real ID Act
aimed to improve security).
168. Cf. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505–07 (2012) (finding that section
5(C) of S.B. 1070 “would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect
to unauthorized employment of aliens,” and section 6 would fall under “no coherent understanding” of Congress’ intent for state officers’ cooperation with federal law in the arrest of aliens).
169. Id. at 2501 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ciaries, along with its clarification on the lack of difference between
171
“deferred action” and “deferred action for childhood arrivals,”
helps support the idea that Congress intended noncitizens such as
DACA beneficiaries to be able to obtain temporary driver’s licenses,
and state laws to the contrary should be pre-empted.
C. Policy Arguments for Allowing DACA Beneficiaries to Obtain Driver’s
Licenses
Perhaps the best arguments for why DACA beneficiaries should
be able to obtain driver’s licenses are policy-based. Parts II.C.1 and
II.C.2 argue that increased public safety and reduced insurance costs,
respectively, support the licensing of all qualified drivers, regardless of
immigration status. Both of these arguments apply with full force to
DACA beneficiaries. Part II.C.3 explains why the ability to drive is
necessary to secure employment; this argument is especially pertinent
to DACA beneficiaries since they are authorized and encouraged to
work. Beyond these safety, financial, and employment rationales lies
pure politics. After the 2012 presidential election, it is clear that minority voters, particularly Latinos, have a powerful voice in election
172
Although DACA beneficiaries do not have voting privioutcomes.
leges, U.S. citizens who support them do. Thus, immigrant-friendly
policies will likely translate to smart political moves post-2012.

170. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
171. See DACA FAQs, supra note 6 (“Deferred action for childhood arrivals is one form
of deferred action. The relief an individual receives pursuant to the deferred action for
childhood arrivals process is identical for immigration purposes to the relief obtained by
any person who receives deferred action as an act of prosecutorial discretion.”).
172. Latino Voters Showing Strong Turnout in Election 2012, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-06/politics/35505575_1_latino-votershispanic-voter-turnout-mi-familia-vota; Elizabeth Llorente, Election 2012: Obama Wins ReElection,

Clinches

Latino

Vote,

FOX

NEWS

LATINO

(Nov.

6,

2012),

http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/11/06/election-2012-obama-wins-reelection-after-clinching-ohio/; Jose Antonio Vargas, Viewpoint: The Power of the Asian and
Latino Vote, TIME.COM (Nov. 8, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/11/08/viewpoint-thepower-of-the-asian-and-latino-vote/; see also Julia Preston, Republicans Reconsider Positions on
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, at A12 (“One of every 10 voters who cast ballots on
Tuesday was a Latino, and they favored President Obama, with 71 percent of their votes,
compared with 27 percent for Mitt Romney, forcing Republican leaders to wonder if they
could ever regain the presidency without increasing their appeal to Hispanic Americans.”).
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1. Increased Licensing for All Qualified Drivers Increases Safety on
the Roads
The basic purpose for issuing driver’s licenses is to promote public safety by ensuring competent drivers. 173 Generally, to obtain a
driver’s license, an applicant must pass a written test on the state’s
174
According to the
driving rules, a road test, and often a vision test.
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, the testing of
175
drivers is “an effective highway safety tool.” Because of public safety
concerns, many law enforcement officials have expressed support for
176
For example, Rudy Landerso, Assistant Chief
increased licensing.
177
of Police in Austin, Texas, testified in 2003 in support of H.B. 396, a
Texas bill that would have increased immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses:
[W]e strongly believe it would be in the public interest to
make available to these communities the ability to obtain a
drivers license. In allowing this community the opportunity
to obtain drivers licenses, they will have to study our laws
and pass a driver’s test that will make them not only in178
formed drivers but safe drivers.

173. See ALBERT HARBERSON, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, LICENSED BY THE STATES 21
(2002), http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/infra/sgn0208LicensedByTheStates.
pdf (“Driver’s licenses were created for the purpose of protecting public safety by recognizing those individuals who met the necessary standards . . . includ[ing] age, knowledge
of traffic laws, physical capability to drive and practical driving competence.”).
174. See Odegaard, supra note 142, at 446 (discussing driver’s license testing requirements); Spencer Garlick, Note, License to Drive: Pioneering a Compromise to Allow Undocumented Immigrants Access to the Roads, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 191, 200 (2006) (same).
175. Policy Positions of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, AM. ASS’N OF
MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS 3, http://www.aamva.org/AAMVA-Policy-Positions/ (follow
“Download the AAMVA Policy Positions” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2013); see also
Garlick, supra note 174, at 200 (“Individuals with a driver’s license are likely to be better
drivers than those without because access to driver’s licenses provides access to driver’s
education, which provides knowledge of laws and public safety.”).
176. See Driver’s Licenses for All Immigrants: Quotes from Law Enforcement, NAT’L IMMIGR. L.
CTR. (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter Quotes from Law Enforcement], http://v2011.nilc.org/
immspbs/DLs/DL_law_enfrcmnt_quotes_101404.pdf (quoting thirteen law enforcement
officers from various states on the importance of licensing all drivers).
177. H.B. 396, 77th Leg. (Tex. 2001) available at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/billlookup
/History.aspx?LegSess=77R&Bill=HB396.
178. Quotes from Law Enforcement, supra note 176.
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Many religious community members feel the same. In a letter
to the California State Assembly in 2003, Elizabeth Sholes, Director of
Public Policy at California Council of Churches, wrote: “Assuring that
people who drive are qualified to do so will help diminish accidents
and ensure higher standards of responsible behavior by those with
180
After Illinois passed a bill that will allow undocumotor vehicles.”
181
mented immigrants to receive temporary driver’s licenses, Governor
Pat Quinn affirmed that “Illinois roads will be safer if we ensure every
182
driver learns the rules of the road and is trained to drive safely.”
According to a DACA applicant from Michigan, allowing DACA beneficiaries to obtain driver’s licenses “should be a peace of mind for the
183
Clearly, a broad spectrum of community members recogpublic.”
nizes that increased licensing will improve public safety for everyone
else. Accordingly, DACA beneficiaries should be able to obtain driver’s licenses.
2. Insured Drivers Reduce Insurance Costs for Other Insured Drivers
Each year, accidents caused by uninsured drivers cost more than
184
$4.1 billion in insurance losses. Insured drivers must therefore pay
higher premiums for accidents and injuries caused by uninsured driv-

179. See Driver’s Licenses for All Immigrants: Quotes from Religious Organizations and Leaders,
NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Dec. 2004), http://v2011.nilc.org/immspbs/DLs/DLquotes_relig
_leaders_120804.pdf (quoting ten religious leaders from various states on the importance
of licensing all drivers).
180. Id; see also Ben Poston, DMV Report Adds to License Debate, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/16/local/la-me-unlicensed-20130116 (discussing a recent study conducted by California’s Department of Motor Vehicles that found
unlicensed California drivers to be three times more likely to cause a fatal crash as licensed
drivers, and suggested that “merely meeting the modest requirements necessary to get a
license . . . could improve road safety and help reduce the several thousand fatalities that
occur in the state each year”).
181. See supra note 112.
182. Gustavo Valdes & Catherine E. Shoichet, Illinois Approves Driver’s Licenses for Undocumented Immigrants, CNN (Jan. 8, 2013, 8:34 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/08/us/
illinois-immigrant-drivers-licenses/index.html.
183. Interview 6 (Oct. 15, 2012) (on file with author); see also supra note 73.
184. Fact Sheet: Why Denying Driver’s Licenses to Undocumented Immigrants Harms Public Safety and Makes Our Communities Less Secure, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. 2 & n.7 (Jan. 2008) [hereinafter NILC Fact Sheet], http://v2011.nilc.org/immspbs/DLs/FactSheet_DLs_2008-0116.pdf (citing a 2006 Insurance Research Council news release).
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185

ers. Another argument underlying increased licensing is that it will
increase the percentage of drivers who are insured, as many insurance
companies require proof of a driver’s license before they will insure
186
drivers; this increase will, in turn, reduce insurance costs for all
drivers.
Some states saw a dramatic decrease in the number of uninsured
drivers soon after they implemented policies that allowed all qualified
drivers to obtain driver’s licenses, regardless of their immigration status. For example, upon changing its law in 1999, Utah saw its unin187
sured driver rate drop from 10% in 1998 to 5.1% in 2007. Similarly,
when New Mexico changed its law in 2003, the uninsured driver rate
188
dropped from 33% in 2002 to 10.6% in 2007. When New York considered issuing driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants, “the
State Department of Insurance estimated that expanded license access would reduce the premium costs associated with uninsured motorist coverage by 34 percent,” in turn saving New York drivers $120
189
million each year. Based on this empirical data, it is evident that in185. See Stephanie K. Jones, Uninsured Drivers Travel Under the Radar, INS. J. (Aug. 18,
2003), http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/coverstory/2003/08/18/31590.htm
(quoting Carolyn Gorman of the Insurance Information Institute: “The prices for uninsured motorist coverage are going up at a faster rate than any other part of the auto insurance policy. Everyone pays for it through higher premiums, because you have to insure
yourself for an act that another person should be paying for.”); see also Garlick, supra note
174, at 202–03 (“When an at-fault driver flees an accident or is uninsured, the not-at-fault
driver must then turn to his own insurance company, which, after paying for damages, will
often raise the premium for that driver. Some insurance companies offer a no-fault insurance policy to protect drivers who are involved in accidents with uninsured drivers, but
again, such a policy raises costs for the ordinary driver.”).
186. See Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of
Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 220 (2004) (noting that “insurance companies generally
require drivers to be licensed before they will insure them” and “[i]n most states, liability
insurance must be established in order to register a motor vehicle”).
187. NILC Fact Sheet, supra note 184, at 2. Utah allows those who cannot prove lawful
presence to obtain a Driving Privilege Card. See supra note 112.
188. NILC Fact Sheet, supra note 184, at 2. According to a 2011 report from the Insurance Research Council, however, New Mexico was among the top five states with the highest number of uninsured motorists in 2009 (26%). INS. RES. COUNCIL, RECESSION MARKED
BY

BUMP IN UNINSURED MOTORISTS: IRC ANALYSIS FINDS ONE IN SEVEN DRIVERS ARE

UNINSURED (2011), available at http://www.insuranceresearch.org/sites/default/files/
downloads/IRCUM2011_042111.pdf.
189. Odegaard, supra note 142, at 445–46 & n.70; NILC Fact Sheet, supra note 184, at 2.
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creasing access to driver’s licenses reduces the amount of uninsured
drivers, in turn making accidents and insurance premiums less costly
for other insured drivers. For these reasons, DACA beneficiaries
should be able to obtain driver’s licenses.
3. Having a Driver’s License Will Increase Employment
Opportunities for DACA Beneficiaries
In most parts of the United States, the ability to drive is necessary
190
In 2009, 76.1% of workers
to obtain and maintain employment.
191
In only three locations did at least 10%
drove themselves to work.
192
of the workforce use public transportation to get to work, and in
almost a third of the states, most notably in the South and Midwest,
193
Thus,
less than 1% of the workforce used public transportation.
driving is often a necessity for employment in areas that do not have
194
adequate mass transit systems. As more jobs are found in suburban
areas, the negative effects of being denied a driver’s license are exacerbated for immigrants who settle in those areas and for those who
195
commute from urban areas.
The fact that the federal government offers DACA beneficiaries
work authorization is good reason to believe that it wants young im-

190. Garlick, supra note 174, at 203.
191. Transportation Statistics Annual Report, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATS. 95 (2010) [hereinafter TSAR 2010], http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/
transportation_statistics_annual_report/2010/pdf/entire.pdf; see also Most of Us Still Drive
to Work—Alone, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 13, 2007), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/
releases/archives/american_community_survey_acs/cb07-cn06.html (showing that 87.7%
of Americans in 2005 drove to work and 4.7% used public transportation).
192. See TSAR 2010, supra note 191, at 98 (providing a figure of the percentage of
workers using public transportation in 2009). The three locations were New York, District
of Columbia, and New Jersey. Id.
193. Id. Those states were Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Vermont. Id.
194. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
195. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and
the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 175 (2001) (“Due in large part to the suburbanization of the American economy, inadequate transportation drastically limits the job prospects of low-income individuals, especially those who live in inner-city neighborhoods.”);
Pabón López, supra note 142, at 97 (providing examples of difficulties immigrants face
when living in suburban or rural areas where driving to work is a necessity).
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migrants to contribute to the economy. According to a DACA applicant from Maryland, the ability to work without the ability to drive is
196
After learning that
like “having only half of what’s promised.”
Michigan announced it would not allow DACA beneficiaries to obtain
driver’s licenses, a DACA applicant from Michigan questioned, “Why
197
By
would we even apply for [DACA] if we can’t have a license?”
prohibiting DACA beneficiaries from obtaining driver’s licenses,
states are limiting their employment prospects, especially if they live
198
A DACA apin areas with limited access to public transportation.
plicant from Maryland explained that if she could not drive, she
would have to get a job within walking distance from her house, and
those do not pay well; but if she could drive, she explained, “I would
199
have access to more jobs that would pay more.” An applicant from
Michigan said, “Who is going to hire you if you have no form of
transportation to get to work and back? . . . It’s not like everybody
200
lives next to their job.” Thus, granting DACA beneficiaries authorization to work but denying them licenses to drive is counterproductive. For this reason especially, DACA beneficiaries should be able to
obtain driver’s licenses.
III. CONCLUSION
The new Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program has
brought the debate over immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses into a
new light. The legal precedents in this field do not provide an en201
couraging framework for DACA beneficiaries. But, considering the
202
similarities between DACA beneficiaries and the Plyler plaintiffs, and
the differences between DACA beneficiaries and undocumented im203
migrants generally, it is likely that a state denying driver’s licenses to
DACA beneficiaries will have a difficult time in court. Both the legis-

196. Interview 5 (Oct. 9, 2012) (on file with author).
197. Interview 7 (Oct. 13, 2012) (on file with author).
198. See Bassett, supra note 143, at 303–04 (noting that most rural areas offer mainly
low-wage jobs because there are fewer job opportunities in industries that pay higher wages).
199. Interview 2 (Oct. 3, 2012) (on file with author).
200. Interview 6 (Oct. 15, 2012) (on file with author).
201. See supra Part I.
202. See supra Part II.A.1.
203. See supra Parts II.A.1–2.
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lature—through the Real ID Act —and the executive—through the
205
USCIS regulations —help make this clear. Fortunately, most states
will not have to encounter any potential legal battles since they allow
206
DACA beneficiaries to obtain driver’s licenses. A close inquiry into
the policy reasons for licensing DACA beneficiaries helps explain why
207
these states made the right decision.

204. See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
207. See supra Part II.C.

